Harvard University Press
Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations
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Title: Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations
Author: Peter D Feaver
ISBN: 9780674010512
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Published: 2003
Binding: Hardcover
Language: English
Condition: Used: Near Fine
Excellent, unmarked copy with little wear and tight binding. We ship in recyclable American-made mailers. 100% money-back guarantee on all orders.
Q 1615963
Publisher Description:
How do civilians control the military? In the wake of September 11, the renewed presence of national security in everyday life has made this question all the more pressing. In this book Peter Feaver proposes a theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the armed servants of the nation-state. Military obedience is not automatic but depends on strategic calculations of whether civilians will catch and punish misbehaviour.
Author: Peter D Feaver
ISBN: 9780674010512
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Published: 2003
Binding: Hardcover
Language: English
Condition: Used: Near Fine
Excellent, unmarked copy with little wear and tight binding. We ship in recyclable American-made mailers. 100% money-back guarantee on all orders.
Q 1615963
Publisher Description:
How do civilians control the military? In the wake of September 11, the renewed presence of national security in everyday life has made this question all the more pressing. In this book Peter Feaver proposes a theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the armed servants of the nation-state. Military obedience is not automatic but depends on strategic calculations of whether civilians will catch and punish misbehaviour.
